Nuclear deal – what the scientists say
10 July 2008
Defence scientists say that after the last tests they may no longer need to carry out further nuclear tests, should India choose to develop nuclear weapons, writes Rajiv Singh.
New Delhi: The UPA government has submitted a draft text of the safeguards agreement to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) for clarification before formal ratification. The safeguards text, worked out with IAEA inspectors early this year, has been sent to the agency's 35-nation board in Vienna for approval.
The text reportedly envisages support for Indian efforts to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors. (See: Text of Draft)
The draft reportedly says that the Indian government may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
The draft also says that the Indian government will ensure that none of the materials produced in the safeguarded facilities shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose. Such material, according to the Indian government, shall be used for peaceful purposes only and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
These provisions are already beginning to raise eyebrows amongst the international community of 'experts'. They are pointing to a number of 'ambiguities', which they say need to be clarified by the UN watchdog body before ratification.
The draft, according to certain Washington-based think tanks, contains several points that "raise questions that board members need to get clarity on", according to a report in the International Herald Tribune. The report quotes Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, as saying that the clause in the draft that says India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies," could potentially restrict international monitoring of India's atomic programme.
