New Delhi: The fine print of the Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to lift its three decade-long embargo on nuclear commerce with India is finally out and a quick scan shows the fine balance it seeks to maintain in accommodating India's 'red lines' and its demand for a 'clean' exemption against the comprehensive international safeguards sought by the NPT ayatollahs.
The two-page 'NSG's Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India' states that the body approves the transfer of ''trigger list items and/or related technologies to India for peaceful purposes for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities'' and ''nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technologies'', provided India adheres to the NSG's guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Part 2 respectively).
(See: NSG statement on India)
This clears enrichment and reprocessing transfers from NSG member states, which is a critical requirement for India if it is to set up imported light water reactors in the country.
Paragraph 2g of the statement takes specific note of India's voluntary commitment on ''continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty''.
On the issue of imposition of permanent safeguards on Indian facilities, Paragraph 2a refers to India's March 2006 ''separation plan'', under which India will put at least eight additional nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards by 2014 over and above the current six.
As part of the review of the waiver process among member countries, Paragraph 3c and 3e mandate NSG members to report on their nuclear transfers to India and consult regularly on India's ''implementation'' and ''compliance'' with its stated non-proliferation commitments.
After the three-day (4-6 September, 2008) drama enacted at Vienna, a number of NSG States, including Austria, China, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, have subsequently issued national statements outlining their views on how the NSG's policy on India will be implemented.
This is in line with India's demand that each country's conditions for engaging with it should not be front-loaded on to the final NSG waiver. Instead, each country may separately prescribe its own conditions for engaging in nuclear trade with India once the waiver has been granted.
In its statement Japan has noted that if India resumed testing, "the logical consequence is to terminate trade."
Germany has noted that it expects India to take further non-proliferation and disarmament measures, including "entry into force of the CTBT and a termination of fissile material production for weapons."