

Structural Changes in India's labour markets

10

CHAPTER

To exploit its demographic dividend, India must create millions of “good”—safe, productive, well-paying—jobs. These tend to be in the formal sector. This chapter studies constraints on formalisation and reviews a number of ongoing developments which are responding to these challenges. First, the increasing use of contract labour supplied by specialised staffing companies, which allows large firms to grow, raising aggregate productivity. Second, the dynamic of competitive federalism is at work, with states competing to attract employment-intensive, high-quality companies. But what a company manufactures matters not only because it affects employment and growth today, but because it shapes the set of products a country can produce in the future. Some products, like cellphones, can help India produce other high-tech products and climb technology ladders, leading to faster medium-term growth. The third trend involves labour-intensive manufacturing—like apparel—firms relocating to smaller cities. This business model has both commercial and social advantages. Firms benefit from lower costs, and also create “suitable” jobs for women which can otherwise be rare in towns which have rapidly urbanised. The centre could complement these developments and boost formal sector job growth by expanding employees’ choice regarding their employment benefits.

INTRODUCTION

10.1 India is midway through its demographic dividend—a period of time when demography gives economic growth a boost by expanding the working-age share of the population. To exploit this dividend and meet the growing aspirations of those entering the labour force, India's economy needs to create enough “good jobs” – jobs that are safe and

pay well, and encourage firms and workers to improve skills and productivity.

10.2 Figure 1 shows employment growth between 1989 and 2010¹. Two things are notable. First, informal firms account for most employment growth and nearly all the increase in the number of establishments since 1989². Of the 10.5 million new manufacturing jobs created between 1989 and 2010, only 3.7 million—about 35 per


¹ We stop our analysis in 2010 because of data constraints. While there is annual data on formal enterprises, data on informal firms is only released every 5 years. The latest such NSSO round was in 2010.

² For the most part, following other authors, we consider the informal firms to be those which have little to no contact with the government. There are many possible alternative definitions of informality but this is perhaps the most relevant one for our purposes.

cent—were in the formal sector. This pattern is even starker when looking at growth in establishment counts: total establishments increased by 4.2 million from 1989-2010³, but the formal sector accounted for only 1.2 per cent of this growth. Second, trends seem somewhat different after 2000: informal sector establishment counts flatten and employment actually falls, while formal sector employment picks up. This might be related to the increasing use of contract labour, described in more detail in the next section.

10.3 The informal sector should thus be credited with creating jobs and keeping unemployment low. Yet, by most measures informal sector jobs are much worse than formal sector ones—wages are, on average, more than 20 times higher in the formal sector, though informal sector wages have grown somewhat faster between 1989-2010. Formal sector jobs also score better on some non-pecuniary grounds. For example, they allow workers to build employment history—which is important for gaining access to

Figure 1: Indian employment growth in manufacturing



Source: Segura et al (2015).


³ Both level and wage calculations are based on the ASI and NSS. The average annual formal sector wage in 2010 was ₹122,794 while the average informal sector wage was ₹6058.

⁴ Firms argue that Chapter VB of the IDA, which requires firms with >100 employees to seek government approval to retrench workers, encourages them to stay small and forego economies of scale. Of course, other research has suggested alternative reasons why firms stay small (Hsieh and Klenow 2014).

cheaper formal credit.

10.4 Thus the challenge of creating “good jobs” in India could be seen as the challenge of creating more formal sector jobs, which also guarantees worker protection. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that a large portion (about 50 per cent) of “good jobs” in the formal sector (excluding government-owned firms) are in manufacturing.

Figure 2: Industries where formal firms in the private sector create good jobs, 2012




Source: Ministry of Finance calculations.

“REGULATORY CHOLESTEROL” AND THE RISE OF CONTRACT LABOUR FIRMS

10.5 In a recent survey, medium-sized formal sector manufacturing firms reported labour regulations to be a significant barrier to growth, and specifically “dismissal norms under the Industrial Disputes Act”⁴ and “the cumbersome nature of compliance with labour regulations in general” (Chatterjee and Rama, 2015). Numerous regulations also encourage rent-seeking behaviour. Figure 4 shows that higher rents predict lower growth in formal sector employment and higher future growth in informal sector employment.

Figure 3: Growth in Ratio of Unregistered to Registered Manufacturing Employment vs Regulatory Costs⁵



Source: Amirapu and Gechter (2016).

CONTRACT LABOUR

10.6 The slow pace of labour reform has encouraged firms to resort to other strategies to negotiate “regulatory cholesterol”. One popular strategy is to hire contract workers, which has two key benefits: first, the firm essentially subcontracts the work of following regulations and “managing” inspectors to the contract labour firm. Second, because contract workers are the employees of the contractor and are not considered workmen in the firm, the firm stays small enough to be exempt from some labour law.

10.7 Contract labour use has grown throughout the world over the last few decades, and India is no exception. Contract

workers increased from 12 per cent of all registered manufacturing workers in 1999 to over 25 per cent in 2010.⁶ That this growth is related to firms’ incentives to negotiate labour regulations is suggested by the fact that contract labour use grew faster in states that, by some measures, have relatively more rigid labour laws (Figure 4). Moreover, Figure 5 shows that these trends are particularly striking for plants with more than 100 workers—i.e. plants to which the IDA applies.⁷ As a result, large firms—previously the most constrained under labour laws—have benefited from the growth of contract labour. Recent research has found that districts which saw an increase in staffing agency employment also experienced

⁵ This graph is a partial residual plot which depicts the correlation between growth in the ratio of unregistered to registered manufacturing labour and regulatory costs as estimated by Amirapu and Gechter (2016), while controlling for net state domestic product per capita and the share of total employment in manufacturing.

⁶ Calculations from the Annual Survey of Industries.


⁷ There is also evidence of the link between contract labour and labour regulations that is more than merely suggestive: Chaurey (2015) shows that manufacturing plants located in states with more rigid labour laws are more likely to respond to positive demand shocks by hiring contract workers than plants in less constrained states.

an increase in the proportion of large plants and a reduction in marginal labour costs and adjustment costs among large firms.⁸

10.8 The easing of constraints on larger firms has led researchers to estimate that contract labour has boosted manufacturing GDP annually by 0.5 per cent between 1998-99 and 2011-12.¹⁰ Yet, when asked, many


large firms say contract labour is not the ideal solution, and that they would prefer to hire regular workers if dismissal laws were different. Hiring workers through a contractor can be more expensive—14 per cent more expensive according to the Indian Cellular Association. Furthermore, contract workers do not feel as much loyalty to the company as regular workers would,

Figure 4: Share of Contract Workers by Labour Regime⁹



Source: Chaurey (2015).

Figure 5: Share of Contract Workers by Labour Regime



Source: Bertrand, et al (2015).

⁸ These facts are inferred from i) an increase in the thickness of the right tail of the firm size distribution, ii) a reduction in the average product of labour among large firms, and iii) an increase in the dispersion of employment growth and the number of new products produced by large firms. See Bertrand et al (2015).

⁹ In this figure and the next, states with more rigid labour laws are defined to be those that have made more “pro worker” amendments to the IDA, according to Besley and Burgess (2004) and Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2009).

¹⁰ Bertrand et al (2015).

reducing employers' incentive to invest in their training. Indeed, there is evidence that hiring contract workers today hurts a firm's productivity tomorrow, precisely because contract workers do not accumulate "firm-specific human capital".¹¹ Finally, any overall assessment of contractualisation must also account for its impact on worker protection and workers' rights.

COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM

10.9 With private investment lagging (see chapter 1), states are under pressure to be seen as attractive destinations for investments that will create jobs and boost economic growth. Several states, such as Rajasthan, have responded by amending their labour laws with the goal of attracting large employers and high growth industries to their state, and other states like Gujarat and Maharashtra are considering steps in this direction.

10.10 Some companies have the potential to create many "good jobs" in the formal manufacturing sector for relatively unskilled workers. Indeed, improving employment prospects and wages was the primary motivation for countries like China and states like Tamil Nadu to embrace manufacturing products such as mobile phones.

10.11 Moreover, the benefits of the entry of a large manufacturing company to a state can go beyond scale, depending on the kind of products they manufacture. Recent economic research argues that "what you export matters", because exporting develops a country's local know-how and supply chain networks, bringing it closer to the global frontier for the exported good¹². These skills may be more transferable across certain industries than others. For example, it may be easier to make cars—a complex product—once a country has developed

expertise in making bicycles—a simpler but related product. In this sense, what a country manufactures today matters not just because it affects employment and growth today, but also because it shapes the set of products a country can profitably produce tomorrow.


10.12 Where do products like mobile phones fit in this "Atlas of Economic Complexity"? We introduce two intuitive terms, based on Hausmann (2007): (1) PRODY, the average GDP of countries producing a particular product. PRODY is thus a measure of the "quality" of a particular product. Figure 6 shows the distribution of goods according to their PRODY scores. Cell phones fare relatively well, appearing in the 70th percentile of products. (2) EXPY is an analogous measure for the "quality" of a country's export mix. It is calculated as the average of PRODY for all products a country exports, and is a good predictor of subsequent economic growth.

10.13 India's EXPY is depicted in Figure 7, in which the red line is the PRODY value for cell phones. Cell phones are a much "higher quality" export item than the average Indian export, and hence increasing Indian cell phone exports would—loosely speaking—improve the quality of its export basket and enable it to transition to other high value-added products in future. The idea that producing certain goods may allow one to later branch out into other related but higher growth areas is borne out in China's history. When China first entered the mobile phone assembly space, it was producing only electrical connectors and cables; now it is producing sophisticated, high growth and high valued-added products such as smartphones and tablets.


10.14 There may be a possibility of competitive federalism becoming "too competitive", inducing a race to the bottom

¹¹ Soundararajan (2015).

¹² Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, (2007); Hausman and Hidalgo, (2009). This can happen if the potential for learning spillovers is particularly great in some activities, and is perhaps limited by a network structure among industries.



Source: Author's calculations using data from Hausmann, et al (2007) and Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009).



Source: Ministry of Finance calculation using data from Hausmann, et al (2007) and Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009).

with states pushed into giving too many concessions. But India seems far from such a situation. For example, changes that certain states are considering—such as Haryana's proposed online filing of returns through a single form covering 12 separate labour laws and e-maintenance of all labour-related records—would likely improve compliance and worker welfare.

RELOCATION

10.15 Apparel is an industry in which India should be performing well. It is labour-intensive, with 30 per cent of costs from wages. Only 2-3 per cent of costs are due to capital-intensive inputs like power. And yet India is ceding market share in the global apparel industry to countries like Bangladesh

and Vietnam (Figure 8). How can India’s productivity in apparel be improved? The insights in chapter 2 suggest that productivity could be substantially improved by reallocating capital from less-productive to more-productive firms.

10.16 Formal sector apparel firms are about 15 times more productive than their informal sector counterparts¹³. Yet Figure 9 shows that India’s apparel sector is dominated by

informal firms: approximately 2.0 million establishments employing about 3.3 million workers (average size 1.5 workers), dwarfing the formal apparel sector’s 2800 firms which employ 330,000 workers (average size 118 workers). Indeed, apparel firms now make up the largest share of establishments in the informal sector.

10.17 Much of this mushrooming is due to a very large increase in the incidence of






Figure 9: The Informalisation of India’s apparel firms



Source: MoF Calculations.

¹³ The labour productivity of formal sector apparel firms is about ₹430,000 per worker compared to the informal apparel sector’s ₹28,800 per worker.

Figure 10: The mushrooming of 1-person apparel firms

Source: Segura et al (2015).

1-person apparel establishments in urban areas, as Figure 10 shows. Spatial mismatch between firms and workers might explain why formal sector apparel firms might find it difficult to expand. Living costs are high in cities, rendering cost-sensitive, labour-intensive manufacturing uncompetitive. High transport costs and weak connectivity between metros and suburban areas preclude the possibility of living outside the city and commuting to work.

10.18 In this section, we highlight a business model that some formal sector apparel manufacturers are adopting—relocating in second- and third-tier towns and cities. This business model of moving factories to workers has a number of commercial and social advantages—it involves spreading economic development to underdeveloped

areas, reduces spatial mismatch in the labour market and can improve competitiveness by raising firms' access to lower cost labour.

10.19 The apparel industry typically employs many female workers: for instance about 70 per cent of the employees of India's largest apparel exporter are women. Therefore, apparel manufacturers locating in rural areas can help address the low rates of female labour force participation that prevent India from achieving its full economic potential. Most explanations of low labour force participation in India focus on supply-side factors like cultural norms that frown on women working outside the home. Less attention has been given to demand-side explanations, which essentially emphasise that a key determinant of female labour force participation (LFP) is the availability

of suitable jobs¹⁴. It is a striking fact that the areas in India that have seen the greatest decline in female labour force participation in the last decade are those villages that have rapidly urbanised and are now part of towns and small cities.¹⁵ Farming jobs in these areas are no longer available, but women-friendly service sector jobs are yet to take their place. From this perspective, female LFP can be expected to depend on the availability of ‘suitable jobs’, which are flexible and located close to home. In fact recent research suggests that more than half of the decline in female LFPR is explained by a deficit of suitable jobs at the local level.¹⁶

10.20 The “relocation” model addresses this concern by offering precisely the kind of suitable jobs—located in small cities, utilising women’s comparative advantage in garments, flexible working hours and childcare on site—that women in rapidly urbanising areas are looking for but often do not have. Thus the “relocation” model could be termed a win-win-win: commercially advantageous for the manufacturer, bringing women into the labour market, and boosting growth.

10.21 Recent studies have estimated that India’s GDP would grow by an additional 1.4 per cent every year if women were to participate as much as men in the economy¹⁷. In addition to higher economic growth, gainful work by women—and especially paid employment—is correlated with a host of positive outcomes, including more agency at the household level and in society more broadly, and greater investments in children’s health and education¹⁸. This illustrates the social externalities of the relocation model.

THE CENTRE’S ROLE IN CREATING “GOOD JOBS”—ENSURING WORKER-CENTRIC LABOUR REGULATION

10.22 The previous sections highlight how, via a mixture of *Jugaad* and competitive federalism, the private sector and States are taking initiatives to create “good jobs”. What levers does the Centre have to support this process? One key role is to ensure that labour regulation is worker-centric, by expanding workers’ choice and reducing mandatory taxes on formal sector employment.

10.23 Table 1 presents an illustrative example of the components of compensation for two hypothetical employees: one earning a basic salary of ₹5,500 per month, the other earning ₹55,000 per month. Two striking facts emerge from this table. First, there is a significant wedge between gross and take-home pay for lower earners—45 per cent if one counts employer contributions and deductions from employees’ pay. Second, the equivalent wedge is much smaller for higher earners—only 5 per cent owing both to fewer mandatory employer contributions and fewer mandatory deductions from gross pay. Of course, higher earners may still voluntarily contribute from their own take-home salaries to, say, the EPF—but lower earners have no such choice.

10.24 How should one think of mandated worker benefits like the EPF? The answer depends first on how highly the benefits are valued by workers. The answer also depends on who pays the cost, i.e. whether it is the employee or the employer who is contributing. However, economic theory makes clear that the true economic incidence—or burden—of

¹⁴ Kannan et al. (2012), Chand et al. (2014) and Klasen et al. (2015).

¹⁵ Chatterjee, Murgai and Rama (2015).

¹⁶ Chatterjee, Murgai and Rama (2015).

¹⁷ “The Power of Parity: Advancing Women’s Equality in India”, McKinsey Global Institute, 2015.

¹⁸ *Gender and Jobs* World Development Reports (World Bank, 2011 and 2012).

Table 1: Involuntary Contributions and Deductions to Wages

GROSS EARNINGS PER MONTH	₹ 5,500						₹ 55,000					
	Employer		Employee		Total		Employer		Employee		Total	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
Provident Fund	201	3.67	660	12	861	15.67	-	-	0	0	0	-
Contribution to EPS	458	8.33	0	0	458	8.33	-	-	0	0	0	-
PF Admin Expenses	88	1.61	0	0	88	1.61	-	-	0	0	0	-
ESI	261	4.75	96	1.75	357	6.5	-	-	0	0	0	-
Employee Compensation	-	0	0	0	-	-	30	0.05	0	0	30	0.05
"Professional Tax @"	-	0	75	1.35	75	1.36	-	-	208	0.38	208	0.38
Labour Welfare #	19	0.36	19	0.36	39	0.73	19	0.04	19	0.04	39	0.07
Statutory Bonus	291	5.3	0	0	291	5.3	-	-	0	0	0	-
Gratuity	264	4.81			264	4.81	2,645	4.81	0	0	2,645	4.81
Total Deductions	1,585	28.83	851	15.48	2,437	44.31	2695	4.9	227	0.41	2923	5.32
NET TAKE HOME			₹ 3,062			55.7%			₹ 52,076		94.7%	

Source: A contract labour company.

a tax is shared by employees and employers regardless of the party from who legally pays the cost. The relative burden depends on the elasticities of labour supply and demand—how sensitive workers' willingness to work and firms' willingness to hire are to wages¹⁹. The incidence tends to be on workers, if firms actually pay them a lower wage to offset the higher taxes.

The Example of EPF

10.25 To better understand whether these involuntary contributions are really taxes, we consider the case of EPF in more depth. The EPF, which was created by The Employees' Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, is a fund to which most workers must involuntarily contribute at least 12 per cent of their basic salary²⁰. The money goes into an account managed by the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) and

is meant to provide a lump sum benefit to workers upon retirement. Employers must also contribute 12 per cent of their employees' basic although about 70 per cent of the employers' contribution goes into the Pension Scheme (EPS) while about 30 per cent goes into the EPF.

10.26 In a survey conducted via phone with associates of one of India's largest contract labour companies, workers were asked whether, if given the choice, they would prefer to continue contributing part of their salary into their EPF account or receive the same amount in cash instead²¹. About 70 per cent of respondents said they would prefer to receive cash. This 30 per cent approval rating could signify that a large portion of workers are liquidity constrained—or it could suggest that the functioning of the EPF can be further improved²².

¹⁹ In a competitive labour market, a tax on labour will both increase the effective wage paid by the company and reduce the effective wage received by the employee. In particular, if labour demand is relatively more elastic than labour supply, the tax incidence will fall more heavily on the employee.

²⁰ More precisely, those who, when they first started working, had a basic salary below a certain threshold (which moved from ₹6,500/month to ₹15,000/month in September 2014) must contribute to EPF while those with initial salaries above the threshold may choose whether or not to contribute.

²¹ This survey was conducted over several weeks in January, 2016 by a contract labour company at the request of the Ministry of Finance.

10.27 To better understand their preferences, respondents were asked to explain why they preferred cash or EPF. The most common explanation for preferring cash was a simple preference on the part of workers to spend their money sooner, suggesting either that workers are liquidity constrained or impatient. The second most common reason was the transaction costs associated with withdrawing EPF monies, especially after workers have switched jobs. Indeed, 24 per cent of survey respondents who preferred cash said it was because PF account money was difficult to access. The difficulties are greatest for those workers who change employers frequently, for it has been the case that a new EPF account (with a new account number) was needed for each new job. Workers who changed employers frequently might have up to 20 different accounts and account numbers.

10.28 Further suggestive evidence of high transaction costs can be found in the large number (9.23 crore out of 15 crore total accounts) of inoperative accounts—accounts which have had no contributions or withdrawals for at least 3 years. Approximately ₹44,000 crore lie in these inoperative accounts. However, the EPFO should be commended for recent steps that will reduce transaction costs, such as allowing electronic transfers of money between accounts and creating universal account numbers for all employees that are portable between employers.

10.29 Firms may also face EPF-related transaction costs. Survey evidence has found that 35 per cent of firms find dealing

with EPF-related regulations challenging. The challenges are greatest for small firms without dedicated administrative units to deal with regulatory compliance issues.²³

10.30 Two other EPF-related issues are the relatively high administrative costs and the tax status of EPF accounts. The EPFO requires that employers pay an administrative charge of 0.85 per cent of the worker's salary (recently reduced from 1.10 per cent). This may not seem large, but it amounts to service charges of 3.54 per cent ($=0.85/24$) which are higher than the rates of most private mutual funds.

10.31 While mandatory for the poor, many rich people choose to contribute to EPF as well, though it seems they do so primarily for tax reasons. In many ways, the EPF is an example of a subsidy for the rich (see chapter 6 for other examples). EPF contributions have an EEE status—Exempt, Exempt, Exempt—meaning that contributions, interest earned and withdrawals are all exempt from tax. This offers little benefit to workers who are mandated to contribute, because even the richest such workers—who earn ₹15,000 a month—would be below the income tax threshold.

10.32 Policymakers should consider whether lower earners should be offered the same choice—of whether to contribute part of their salaries to the EPF—which the rich have. This would both introduce competition in the market for savings, which may improve EPFO's service standards, and allow the poor—some of whom may be liquidity constrained—to optimise as per their own personal requirements. To be

²² Another explanation is that people behave in a way that is consistently “short-sighted”, and they therefore do not put appropriate value on forced savings mechanisms. However, there is evidence that many people do recognize the value of forced savings mechanisms and will choose to opt in to such schemes if given the choice (e.g. Ashraf, Karlan and Yin, 2006).

²³ “Many firms felt that the compliance procedures were outdated. In one instance, although a firm had fully computerized its employee records it still maintained paper copies for the purposes of compliance under the EPF and ESI Acts” (Chatterjee and Rama, 2015). The survey was done in 2013, and some of these concerns may have already been addressed by the recent changes in EPF operation.

clear, the employer's 12 per cent contribution to EPF/EPS would be unaffected. The only difference would be that employees could choose whether or not to save 12 per cent of their salary into EPF or keep it as take home pay. Such a change would effectively reduce the tax on formal sector labour while leaving informal sector labour costs unchanged. In a relative sense, it would therefore reduce the cost of hiring workers in the formal sector and incentivize more people into formality, where productivity levels and growth are higher.

CONCLUSION

10.33 India's most pressing labour market challenge going forward will be to generate a large number of good jobs. These jobs tend to be formal sector jobs. Two obstacles to formal sector job creation are regulation-induced taxes on formal workers and spatial mismatch between workers and jobs. Encouragingly, firms and workers are finding solutions to deal with these obstacles that are even more varied than the obstacles themselves, as we have been described in this chapter. Meeting the challenges ahead will require more of such ingenuity, and the private sector, state governments and the Centre will all have important roles to play.

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