The Indian establishment may derive some satisfaction from the tough conditions attached by the US to $7.5 billion in aid for Pakistan, but only just, writes Rajiv Singh.

Washington: Pakistan may be happy about the fact that Washington lawmakers have finally cleared the Kerry-Lugar bill, which provides for $7.5 billion in US aid to that country till 2014, but its military establishment may have reasons to squirm over the conditions that come attached with the dole.

From left, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Adm. Mike Mullen speaks with chief of army staff of the Pakistan Army Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Lieut. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, director general of Inter-Services Intelligence on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln while under way in the North Arabian Sea on 27 Aug. 2008.

Amongst other stringent conditions, the bill also seeks to keep tabs on Pakistan's attempts to use terrorist outfits for attacks on neighbouring countries.

This provision seeks to directly impact Pakistani inclinations to utilise terror, or a Pakistani euphemism for the same activity - jihad.

Broadly, the conditions attached to the bill seek that the US secretary of state will certify on a six-monthly basis that Pakistan continues its efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida, the Taliban,  and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas, that it continues to eliminate safe havens of such forces in Pakistan, that it continues to close terrorist camps,  including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that it does not provide any support for extremist and terrorist groups  and that it ensures that it prevents attacks into neighbouring  countries from such forces.

Though the bill takes care to leave out any references to any countries in the region affected by state use of terrorism by Pakistan, such as India, Afghanistan and to a certain extent Bangladesh, Section 203 of the Senate Bill S.1707 asks the secretary of state to certify that Pakistan has made progress on matters such as "ceasing support, including by  any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to  extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted  attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against  the territory or people of neighbouring countries."

For good measure the bill seeks oversight of Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities through Section 203 (C) of the bill which requires the secretary of state  to certify that the government of Pakistan "is continuing to cooperate with the  United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the  acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant  information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such  networks."

The bill enjoins the secretary to provide a six-monthly assessment to Congress on  "whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the  expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of  United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources  that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its  nuclear weapons program."

The bill also seeks certification from the secretary of state that Pakistan is preventing terrorist  groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed from operating in the  territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into  neighbouring countries, dismantling terrorist bases of operations,  and taking action when provided with intelligence about  high-level terrorist targets.

Desperate as Pakistan has been to access US funds in order to stave off a serious situation with respect to its  balance of payments position, the Kerry-Lugar bill is now causing serious disquiet in sections of the Pakistani establishment - particularly its military and intelligence.

Section 302 of the bill enjoins the secretary of state, in consultation with  secretary of defense, to assess and report to Congress every six months whether  "the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military,  including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and  parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of  command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian  involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil  administration."

Needless to say such provisions are goading Pakistan's powerful military and intelligence establishment to attack the Pakistani civilian establishment for allowing such, all-pervasive, American scrutiny. Though the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment is upset with the provisions, as they seek to extend and encourage civilian control over military affairs, which have hitherto remained strictly off-limits for the civil side of the government, the fact remains that the precarious nature of the country's foreign exchange position and its internal economy will compel the establishment to accept any and all  'humiliating' conditions.

Fortuitously, the Indian prime minister Dr Manmohan Singh spoke up recently drawing attention to Pakistan's use of terror as state policy to coincide with the passage of the bill in the US Congress.  This would have shored up Congress resolve to pass the bill with Indian 'concerns' duly attended to. The Obama administration has been touting India as a strategic partner of great importance in the coming century.

There was nothing new in Singh's assertion, as the Indian establishment has been shouting itself hoarse on this issue for decades. However, attempts by India to implicate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror, or even to respond militarily to acts of extreme terrorist provocation, have been consistently neutered by the US establishment as it needed to be actively engaged with Pakistan's military establishment - first to battle Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and now to battle Muslim extremism as represented by the al-Qaeda.

The conditionalities of the Kerry-Lugar bill would appear to directly address Indian concerns, but the fact is that virtually on every issue direct US concerns are being addressed and only incidentally Indian or Afghan concerns.

Pakistan's diversion of anti-terror related US aid to shore up military capabilities against India during the Bush era became an issue with US lawmakers as they sought to know why all the generous funding was yielding little, or no, results where it mattered - that is in Afghanistan or Pakistan's FATA regions.

This resulted in a position being reached early in 2009 when influential lawmakers made it clear that the administrations' attempts to rustle up financing for Pakistan's involvement in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would not be a smooth affair until explanations were provided for past use of funds and proposed utilisation of funds in the future.

So, when it seeks substantial oversight on utilisation of funds the Kerry -Luger bill primarily addresses domestic concerns and only incidentally Indian ones over diversion of funds to shore up military capabilities against India.

The Obama administration has made nuclear non-proliferation a grandstanding issue for itself, as evidenced by its sponsorship of a Security Council resolution at the United Nations supporting universal acceptance of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, so any oversight of Pakistan's nuclear activities is a matter of active US state policy for this administration and only incidentally an acknowledgement of Indian concerns on the matter.

Perhaps the most significant development in US-Pak relations has been a clear dissociation from the 'we-are-good-ol'-pals' philosophies that determined earlier US policy initiatives with respect to Pakistan, as it is now clear that  the fierce opposition that US and international forces face in the killing fields of Afghanistan are for the best part directed and sustained by the Pakistan military and intelligence set-up.

At its end, the Pakistani military establishment makes no bone about the fact that over 70 per cent of its conventional military equipment is sourced from China. Its deep seated strategic and nuclear relationship with China, with which it has partnered in proliferation-related activities, has effectively replaced any strategic relationship it may have shared in the past with the US at the time of the Cold War and the Afghanistan imbroglio with the Soviet Union.

The increasing 'mullahisation' of the Pakistani military/strategic establishment has also left the US establishment, and in particular its military Central Command (CENTCOM) under which jurisdiction Pakistan figures as a nation and with which it has a long standing relationship, without any illusions as to the nature of the relationship it now shares with this increasingly radicalised establishment.

An oversight of the Pakistan military directly aids in American conduct of operations against  the Taliban, both Afghani and Pakistani. The flourishing Islamic militias inside Pakistan are virulently against all things American - indeed the United States, Israel and India are the prime cause of their frustrations and anger. All such militias, or Tanzeems, once again owe their existence and near impregnable status to patronage from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.

Any oversight of Pakistani policy and practise with respect to these Tanzeems is of direct concern to the United States, and also, by the way, addresses Indian concerns in the matter.

The Indian policy-making establishment may find solace in the fact that, for a change, the US may now be traveling in the same boat as itself. It's a journey that the US finds itself compelled to make.